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Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law 1
Abstract
The patent system is built on the premise that exclusion leads to innovation. But a mounting
body of evidence calls into question the assumption that “innovation by exclusion” – innovation
based on excluding rivals– is the only, or even primary, way innovation happens today: nearly
50% of manufacturers got the idea for their most important new product from an outside source
that shared it with them, 45-60% of patentees acquire patents to access the technology of others,
and over 1,300 companies, including five of the ten top holders of patents, have pledged to share
their patents with others. But because of the patent system’s traditional focus on exclusion,
policymakers have paid less attention to how patents can better support the diffusion of
technology through mechanisms such as disclosure, transfer, waiver, and the pursuit of freedom
to operate. This paper addresses this gap by exploring in depth the way that the patent system can
encourage the diffusion of technology between rivals and innovators, revealing a surprising
number of overlooked levers within the patent system for encouraging innovation.
For example, making it easier to place inventions in the public domain through effective
defensive publication, encouraging greater disclosure of patent-product relationships through the
marking requirement, and changing the default for provisional applications to being open rather
than closed, and for utility applications to publish upon filing, rather than after an 18-month
delay, but with the right of inventors to opt-out of this default, would enhance patent disclosure
by enabling technical information and permissions to use them to be available earlier to the
world. Improving reporting and discovery of patent information, including ownership,
availability for licensing, licensing status in the case of publicly funded inventions in accordance
with existing law, patent licenses, and standards commitments, could boost markets for
technology. Making it easier to waive patent rights and rely on waivers of patent rights, through
the creation of a government registry of patent rights, and creating, e.g. an “open” or “defensive
only” option that allows patentees to pay discounted maintenance fees in exchange for promising
to use their patents only defensively, or to give up certain rights, akin to “license of right”
schemes in the UK and Germany, would increase freedom to operate. As innovation increasingly
takes place in open and closed modes, and often both, the patent system, by offering more ways
for patentees to decide the fate of their inventions, can increase its relevance to “all of the above”
types of innovation.
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Introduction
On June 12, 2014, Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, published a blog post, “All Our Patent
Belong To You.” 2 In it, he announced that Tesla would “open source” its patents and make them
freely available. 3 The real competition was not the “small trickle” of non-Tesla electric cars, but
the “enormous volumes of gasoline-powered cars being sold every day.” 4 By making its
technology available to all, the company hoped to advance electric vehicle technology, to benefit
all. 5
Like the meme that inspired the post’s name, 6 the announcement engendered admiration,
imitation, and confusion. Was Musk’s move altruistic, about saving the planet, or shrewd, about
driving adoption of Tesla’s technology to achieve market dominance? 7 Was it a marketing
gimmick, or a naïve and self-destructive act, “reduc[ing] the value of the embedded option that is
the primary foundation of the Tesla valuation,” as one investor claimed? 8
Why the strong response? It’s because we’re used to thinking that excluding rather than
including rivals in the practice of one’s technology, leads to innovation. 9 The Constitution
enshrines this idea, authorizing Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
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Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong To You, TESLA MOTORS BLOG (June 12, 2014),
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you (last visited _______).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
“All your base are belong to us,” which is a poor “Engrish” translation of a Japanese phrase meaning “we have
taken over every last one of your bases,” that was featured in the introduction to a Japanese video game called Zero
Wing. See Explanation of the Phrase “All your base are belong to us.” ASKVILLE BY AMAZON,
http://askville.amazon.com/meant-phrase-base-belong-humorous-couldn%E2%80%99tmeaning/AnswerViewer.do?requestId=2265435 (last visited______).
7
Serguei Netessine & Karan Girotra, Tesla Goes Big, Not Home, HARV. BUS. R. (June 17, 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/06/tesla-goes-big-not-home/ (last visited ______).
8
Technology Equity Strategies, Did Tesla’s Actions in Detroit Put its Patents in the Public Domain? Why Investors
Should Worry, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 15, 2015), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2918086-did-teslas-actions-indetroit-put-its-patents-in-the-public-domain-why-investors-should-worry?page=2 (last visited _____).
9
The role of exclusion in the patent system has been the subject of a number of recent scholarly articles, see, e.g.,
Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900
(2013) (articulating the concept of an excludability continuum); Oscar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion
in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643 (2010) (examining the benefits of limiting patent law’s broad exclusion to actual
copying, as in copyright law); Adam Mosoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
321 (2009) (using a historical lens to examine the “exclusion concept” in patent law, or the right to exclude, as
distinct from the larger set of “exclusive rights” traditionally associated with property that also include the positive
rights of use and possession).
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securing [] to [] Inventors the exclusive right to their [] Discoveries.” 10 As the Supreme Court
has added, “the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others.” 11 (emphases added) The
importance of exclusion is deeply engrained in property theory – providing owners with the
incentive to preserve and utilize property more efficiently. 12
Tesla’s move turns this logic on its head. Instead of discouraging imitators, it’s creating
them. Instead of excluding rivals, Tesla’s patents are diffusing its technology to them, and also
serving to pave the way for Tesla’s use of its rivals’ patents, spurring further innovation. It
appears to be working. Following the announcement, BMW, Nissan and Tesla, who together
make 80% of the world’s electric-car batteries, 13 were in talks about collaborating on global
vehicle-charging standards. 14 Later, Toyota announced that it would open its hydrogen-car
patents. 15 Then, the LG group announced that it would share its 29,000 patents, to small and
medium-sized companies, and make another 3,058 freely available to startups. 16 The sharing has
spread beyond electric cars. Panasonic has moved to open up its source code, technology and
patents in order to expedite R&D about the ‘Internet of Things.’ 17 A branch of the conglomerate
Daweoo will share patents and knowhow relating to liquefied natural gas (LNG) engine
technology with local entrepreneurs, and a number of Korean firms, including Samsung,
Hyundai Motors, Lotte and have announced plans to open open innovation hubs. 18 Companies
like Facebook 19 and Bistream 20 have announced that they are developing technology in the open
in areas like 3D printing, Bitcoin, and drones, engaging in massive sharing of what otherwise
would be proprietary technology.

10

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980). (“a patent...consists altogether in the right to
exclude.”)
12
See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. R. 347, 356 (1967) (“an owner, by
virtue of his power to exclude others...[has] incentives to utilize resources more efficiently”), and infra Part I.A.
13
Id.
14
Netessine & Girotra, supra note __.
15
Sebastian Blanco, Toyota Follows Tesla, Makes Hydrogen Patents Open Source, AUTOBLOG (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:30
PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2015/01/05/toyota-follows-tesla-makes-hydrogen-patents-open-source/ (last visited
______).
16
Jack Ellis, LG has as Much to Gain from its Open Innovation Drive as Korea’s SMEs, IAM (Feb. 13, 2015),
http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=c4010b69-e529-48ce-b83f-dc2bce3d763c (last visited ____).
17
http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=0a884580-e30f-4d5a-a827-786dd0b10316
18
Id.
19
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/29/open-sourcing-cars-and-computers/?_r=0
20
http://www.coindesk.com/blockstream-open-source-code-sidechains/
11
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But while notable, Tesla’s move to share technology was not original. Patent licensing is
an old and well-known way for permitting others –exclusively and nonexclusively– to practice
one’s technology, for money. 21 Defensive patenting – holding patents in order to facilitate
freedom to operate, but without the exchange of money – is practiced by an estimated half of
patent holders. 22 Others have opened up their technology without strings. When a Volvo
engineer invented the three-point seatbelt in 1959, the company dedicated the invention to the
public, for the safety of all. 23 At the turn of the 18th century, Benjamin Franklin refused to patent
what came to be later known as the Franklin stove, writing, “as we enjoy great advantages from
the invention of others, we should be glad for an opportunity to serve others by any invention of
ours.” 24
Across industries, contexts, and settings, modern examples abound of creative people
coming up with ideas and, rather than practicing them exclusively, allowing and in some cases
even inducing others to adopt them.
For example, Lego Mindstorms, kits that can be used to create programmable robots,
were designed in a lab at MIT, not in a toy factory in Denmark. 25 Magic Erasers are made of a
material originally marketed for soundproofing and insulation by the German company BASF. 26
Recently, companies like Google, DuPont, IBM, GE, and Pfizer have taken steps to share their
technology with others. 27 The Linux Defenders program creates “defensive patent publications”
in an attempt to put open source technologies into the public domain. 28

21

http://www.hbs.edu/businesshistory/Documents/BHR870102.pdf
See infra, Figure 1 and accompanying cites.
23
Tony Borroz, Strapping Success: The 3-Point Seatbelt Turns 50, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2009),
http://www.wired.com/2009/08/strapping-success-the-3-point-seatbelt-turns-50/ (last visited ____).
24
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 215 (1791)
25
Lego Success Built on Open Innovation, IDEA CONNECTION, http://www.ideaconnection.com/open-innovationsuccess/Lego-Success-Built-on-Open-Innovation-00258.html (last visited _____).
26
Larry Huston & Nabil Sakkab, Connect and develop, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 58 (2006).
27
See PAI’s Comments on the New Strategy for American Innovation, PARTNERSHIP FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION
(Sept. 23, 2014) (describing specific steps its member companies have taken to support open and collaborative
innovation) and Part II.D., infra.
28
About Linux Defenders, LINUX DEFENDERS, http://www.linuxdefenders.org/?page_id=167 (last visited ____).
22
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These examples are indicative of broader trends. While innovation by exclusion – the use
of patents to exclude rivals and others during the term of the patent – remains important, a
mounting body of evidence challenges the assumption that the exclusive practice of one’s own
patents is the only, or even primary way that patents encourage innovation today. Consider the
following:
-

Nearly 50% of manufacturers report that their most important new product originated
from an outside source, and that patented inventions were among the most valuable
inputs; 29
45%-60% of companies say that accessing the technology of others motivates them to
acquire patents; 30
Biopharmaceutical companies signed $32B worth of licenses in 2014; 31 and over a third
of biotech startups license in technology. 32
The patent system has always supported the spread of technology through the greater

availability of the patented product and placement of technology in the public domain when the
patent has expired, 33 and the transferability of patent rights from one innovator to another.
However, as in other property systems, 34 certain forms of patent sharing are not well-supported.
If patent owners want to waive their rights unilaterally, for example they can do so by
announcement, blog post, or other informal mechanism, but the legal status of their commitments
is uncertain. 35 Does Musk’s blog post represent his personal commitment or does it bind the
company if he departs? What if Tesla changes its mind, is bought, or goes bankrupt? The lack of
answers to these questions has the potential to substantially limit the uptake of Tesla’s
29

Ashish Arora, Wesley M. Cohen, & John P. Walsh, The Acquisition and Commercialization of Invention in
American Manufacturing: Incidence and Impact (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20264, 2014).
30
See, infra, Figure 1, and related cites.
31
Survey, The Boston Consulting Grp., 2014 Biopharmaceutical Partnering Survey (Jan. 9, 2015),
http://www.slideshare.net/TheBostonConsultingGroup/2014-biopharmaceutical-partnering-survey (reporting 559
deals x $57M upfront deal value, slides 5 and 6).
32
Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 255 (2009).
33
Described supra, at Part _ (reference section in which Ordover is discussed)
34
The importance of inclusion, and social uses of property has been discussed e.g. in THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is important not only to be able to
exclude other persons from the thing, but also to be able to include other persons in the use and enjoyment of the
thing….”); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75 (1997) (“[U]nderstanding the social use of property . . .
must be as fundamental to understanding property as understanding the way in which property excludes.”). See also
Daniel Kelley, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014).
35
For discussions of the challenges of enforcing patent promises, see Robert P. Merges & Jeffery M. Kuhn,
Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, An, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2009); Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance
Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, __ UTAH L. REV___ (forthcoming 2015).
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technology. Neither are there easy ways for innovators to put their technologies in the public
domain and ensure that they won’t be patented by others, nor let the world know that their
technologies are available for licensing. 36
As such, there is a risk that innovation by diffusion – innovation in which the invention,
or other key input to the innovation process, is spread from one source to another– is happening
less than would be socially optimal. The economic evidence already shows that, while patents
are generally sought for exclusion, they are less important than other means, like lead-time and
secrecy, for appropriating returns to innovation. 37 As innovation becomes increasingly
collaborative, spurred by a reduction in the cost of communication and computing and an
increase in the technological complexity of products, 38 there may be a significant opportunity to
enlarge the innovation-inducing role of the patent system by enhancing its support for
collaboration, with profound social consequences as well. 39
Part I explores the theory, doctrine, and evidence regarding the role of exclusion in the
patent system and how it exclusionary and diffusionary motives. Part II explores nonexclusionary modes of innovation, and “innovation by diffusion,” which is based on the sharing
of ideas. Three case studies– of open innovation in manufacturing based on important work done
by Ashish Arora and his colleagues, of markets for technology, and of defensive patenting–
illustrate the growing significance of innovation by diffusion, and the equally important role of
the patent system in supporting these forms of innovation. Part III articulates a novel “diffusion”
framework and applies it to three diffusive mechanisms of the patent system – disclosure,
transfer, and freedom to operate.
Building upon Parts II and III, Part IV discusses largely overlooked ways that the patent
system could be reformed to support the greater diffusion of technical information and
permissions. For example, removing legal barriers to reading patents, making it easier to place
inventions in the public domain through effective defensive publication, encouraging greater

36

Discussed infra, at Part III.D. Accord Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, _____ (emphasizing the
importance of timing to the disclosure of such information),
37
See infra, Table 1 (showing lead time and sales/service as ranking above patents as means of appropriation).
38
Described, e.g., in Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, OECD (2004)
http://www.oecd.org/science/sci-tech/24508541.pdf, at 16.
39
Discussed infra, at Part II.D.
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disclosure of patent-product relationships through the marking requirement, and changing the
default for provisional patent applications to be open rather than closed, and for utility
applications to publish upon filing, rather than after an 18-month delay, but with the right of
inventors to opt-out of this default, would enhance patent disclosure. Improving reporting and
discovery of patent information, including ownership, availability for licensing, licensing status
in the case of publicly funded inventions in accordance with existing law, patent licenses, and
standards commitments, could boost markets for technology. Making it easier to waive patent
rights and rely on waivers of patent rights, through the creation of a government registry of
patent rights, and creating a “freedom to operate” option that allows patentees to pay discounted
maintenance fees in exchange for promising to use their patents only defensively, akin to
“license of right” schemes in the UK and Germany, would increase freedom to operate. Part V
concludes.
Part I: The Role of Exclusion in the US Patent System
A patent is a legal instrument that bestows a set of exclusive rights to its owner upon
successful application to the patent office. It is also a social bargain. 40 Society gets the
innovation, and, in the patent document, a complete description of a novel invention that others
can learn from. 41 This, all in exchange for one thing – a set of rights to exclude others. Supported
by this basic legal framework, the patent system has created opportunities to foster innovation
through exclusion and diffusion. In this first part of this paper, I discuss the role of exclusion in
the patent system, in theory and in practice, to be followed by an exploration of the role of the
patent system in facilitating innovation through diffusion.
Granting patents has always been associated with taking away the rights of others. The
Venetian Patent Act of 1474, the first of its kind, 42 promised patentees that it would be
"forbidden into every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further device
conforming with [the patented device]....” 43 The first American patent law gave patentees “the
40

See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain
that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for
an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time”)
41
Penrose & Machlup, supra note ___, at 10-11.
42
Fritz Machlup, Report to Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Comm.: An
Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
43
Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventors’ Rights, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 378, 379 (1960).
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sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to others to be
used, the said invention or discovery.” 44 The statute conferred the full suite of property rights –
to use and possess, as well to exclude. 45 However in the 20th century, property theory, under the
influence of legal realists and prominent thinkers like Wesley Hohfeld, evolved to support the
concept of property as a “bundle of rights.” 46 The right to exclude (one stick) became separable
from the other sticks of use, possession and enjoyment. 47
Today, the law gives patent owners the rights to exclude others from making, using,
selling, offering to sell, and importing the patented invention. 48 Many aspects of the patent
system, both in theory and in practice, flow from this exclusionary focus.
A. Patent Law’s Exclusionary Focus
1. Theory
Patent law’s exclusionary bent follows from patents as a form of property. According to
Locke’s oft-cited “Labour Theory of Property,” man has a natural property right over his person,
and by extension, the fruits of his labor. 49 When man takes from nature, and mixes his labor
with it, he removes it from the common state and “excludes the common right of man” from it. 50
Natural rights justifications have been applied to intellectual property, which is shaped out of
facts, ideas, and scientific, technical and other insights that belong to all, 51 though not without
criticism. 52 Securing exclusive rights to inventors, who serve society through their creations, is
also fair and just; 53 preventing others from free-riding off the work of inventors. 54

44

Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
See e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (defining property as that which “consists in the free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions”); see Mosoff, supra note ___ at 350-360 (tracing the history of
such conceptions of property).
46
For a description of this evolution, see Kelley, supra note ___, at 863-865.
47
Id.
48
35 U.S.C. §271(a) (enacted as part of the 1952 Patent Act).
49
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ___(1689)
50
Id.
51
See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (2011).
52
Chief among is these is the characteristic of ideas as cumulative, making it difficult to delineate the fruits that are
directly attributable to one’s labor, and the inability of independent inventors to practice their own inventions. See,
e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 45 (2003).
53
See, e.g. Machlup & Penrose, supra note ___, at 10.
45
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The dominant, utilitarian account of the system justifies patents on the basis that
exclusion incents investment in the creation of new knowledge. 55 Knowledge has properties that
distinguish it from tangible property – first that it is nonrival; as Thomas Jefferson explained in a
famous letter, “he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine.” Second, knowledge is “nonexcludable,” or in Jefferson’s words, made by nature
“expansible over all space…and, like the air…incapable of confinement or exclusive
appropriation.” 56 These “public good” characteristics mean that the gains associated with new
knowledge can’t be reserved to its producers. 57 Protection against imitators, is necessary because
“he who has no hope that he shall reap will not take the trouble to sow.” 58 The right to exclude
hedges against the underproduction of knowledge. 59
Finally, exclusive rights are thought to promote the efficient use of resources, once
created. According to Demsetz, exclusive rights in property provide incentives to maintain and
improve property, in response to market signals that reflect social welfare. 60 Patents also create
“prospects” that facilitate efficient investments in innovation, Kitch has written. 61 For inventions
that can be easily imitated, they enable the expenditures needed to bring the product to market. 62
2. Motives to Patent
The exclusionary thrust of the US patent system is reflected not only in theory, but also in
practice. When asked why they patent, companies consistently answer, to prevent copying and
block patenting by others. Figure 1 shows the responses of two surveys. 96% of the 1,474 R&D
managers surveyed by Cohen and his colleagues indicated that preventing copying motived the

54

See, e.g. Sigrid Sterckx, The Moral Justifiability of Patents, 13 J. EUR. ETHICS NETWORK 249, 255 (2006) (“The
establishment of a patent system is justified because it would be unfair to allow people a ‘free ride’ at the expense of
others who apply themselves to the act of inventing.”)
55
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 38 (2004) (“Intellectual property protection gives
innovators an incentive to invest in new knowledge.”).
56
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
175, 181 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, Riker, Thorne & Co. 1855).
57
Joseph E.Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308 (1999).
58
Jeremy Bentham, A Manual of Political Economy, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, VOL. III 71.
59
Stiglitz, supra note ___, at 311.
60
Demsetz, supra note ___, at 354-459.
61
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 271–75 (1977).
62
Id.

9

acquisition of their last product innovation patent, 63 while 82% of respondents elected the next
highest-ranked answer, the prevention of patenting by others, or “blocking.” 64 86% of the 7,933
American inventors surveyed by Nagaoka and Walsh 65 selected as a reason to patent, enhancing
exclusive exploitation of the invention, the top answer, followed by “blocking,” which was
selected as by 70% of respondents. 66Likewise, among reasons for getting patents, the Berkeley
Patent Survey, of young technology firms, found that “prevent[ing] others from copying our

63

Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), at Figs. 78.
64
Patent blocking can be motivated by a desire to exclude competitors from a particular area, or done in order to
facilitate cross-licensing and create greater freedom to operate. Id. at 21-23. Preventing copying and blocking were
the top answers, respectively, for process invention patents too. Id. at Figs. 7-8
65
Sadao Nagaoka & John P. Walsh, Commercialization and Other Uses of Patents in Japan and the U.S.: Major
Findings from the RIETI-Georgia Tech Inventor Survey, RIETI, IAA (Mar. 2009) (describing the results of a survey
of inventors of “triadic patents” – patents whose applications were filed in both the Japanese Patent Office and the
European Patent Office and granted in the United States Patent).
66
See id. at Figure 13.
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products or services” was the most important reason for getting patents. 67

3. Doctrine – Default to Exclusion
The surveys support the theory – that the purpose of patents is to guard against imitation.
So does legal doctrine, primarily by securing to owners of valid and infringed patents with rights
to exclude. These rights are only meaningful if they cannot be easily avoided by making slight
changes to the product or “designed-around.” 68 As a result, patent law features a “broad
exclusionary rule.” 69 This means that a successful applicant for a patent injunction (not all

67

Graham et al. supra note__ at Figs. 2-3; Accord Gaétan de Rassenfosse et al., Motivations to Patent: Empirical
Evidence from an International Survey, at Table 1 (reporting that, “to prevent imitation by competitors,” was the top
motivator for getting patents among 604 respondents to a survey sent to randomly selected applicants of European
Patent Office (EPO) patents).
68
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, n47 (1997)
(describing the design-around of patents as the use of the claims of a patent “as a guide for deciding what to avoid in
producing a competing product.”)
69
Liivak, supra note ___, at 1662.
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applicants are) 70 can exclude others from practicing not just what the patentee herself did, but
what she describes and claims in the patent, even as that scope changes and enlarges over time
and comes to encompass technology that did not exist at the time of the invention. 71
A preference for exclusion also means that a product that incorporates thousands of
patents may be excluded on the basis of the infringement of a single one. 72 “Patent hold-up,”
when the patentee has undue bargaining power based not on the value of the patented
technology, but the high cost of replacing it, once it has been embedded into a product, 73 has also
concerned policymakers. 74 “Proportionality” concerns in property are not unique to patent law.
As Nozick famously asked “If own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea…do I thereby
come to own the sea?” 75
Patent law’s default to exclusion has created other paradoxes. Though patent law requires
inventors to put details about their inventions in their patents, it discourages others from reading
these details. Under the doctrine of “willfulness,” infringers owe up to triple damages when they
act “despite an objectively high likelihood,” 76 of infringement, and that the “objectively-defined
risk [] was... known.” 77 Actual knowledge of the patent enhances the penalty for infringement. 78
This leads many to avoid reading patents, 79 in effect “undermin[ing] the disclosure function that
is at the foundation of the patent system.” 80

70

Chien and Lemley, supra note __, at 268
See Kitch, supra note __, at 268 (providing an illustration of this breadth based on a fat separation process); see
also Kevin Collins, [add cite].
72
See, e.g. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdups, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL
L. REV. 1,6 (2011). (discussing the harm to consumers that comes from blocking many lawful features, and among
them, one infringing one)
73
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007)
74
See, e.g. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 137-212 (2011)
75
Nozick, supra note ___, at 175. See also, William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, HARVARD LAW,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iptheory.html (discussing Lockean concerns about proportionality and
fairness)
76
See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
77
Id.
79
Compare, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (describing the practice among
component technology companies and researchers of ignoring patents), with Lisa Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 565 (2012) (finding that few academic nanotechnology researchers
surveyed indicated that they worried that reading patents could have negative legal effects); see also infra Part
III.B., regarding the reading of patents across different industry settings, despite willfulness risks.
79
Compare, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (describing the practice among
component technology companies and researchers of ignoring patents), with Lisa Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 565 (2012) (finding that few academic nanotechnology researchers
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B. Structural Limits to Excluding
In theory and by design, then, the patent system offers exclusion as a way for inventors to
recoup investments in R&D and commercialization. But how does it fare in practice? For a
patent to prevent or deter copying of the patent owner’s product, the stars must align in several
ways. First, the patent must be in force at the same time that it is being practiced. The match
between patent and infringer’s product must be discernable. The patent must be credibly
enforceable – which, in turn, turns on the owner’s willingness and ability to bring a suit. All of
these facts influence the extent to which patents can be used for their intended purpose, to
exclude. In the paragraphs that follow I describe the structural limits to using patents to exclude.
1. Timing
Once issued, a patent gives its owner up to 20 years of exclusivity starting from the time
of filing. 81 As a legal instrument, then, patents naturally support the “linear model of
innovation,” according to which a single actor conceives of and takes all the steps necessary to
bring an idea to market. 82 Invention, the conceptualization of a new and nonobvious product or
process, starts the process. Innovation, taking an invention, and developing, improving, adopting
and commercializing it follows. Once there is a product, it can be sold and diffused through the
market. 83
The exclusive rights of patents can hasten progress along several stages of the linear
model. 84 But innovation is often much more chaotic and unpredictable. 85 Novel ideas may prove

surveyed indicated that they worried that reading patents could have negative legal effects); see also infra Part
III.B., regarding the reading of patents across different industry settings, despite willfulness risks.
80
Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri. Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085,
1125 (2003).
81
US Patents are generally eligible for up to 20 years of protection, though extensions may be available to
compensate for regulatory or processing delays. However, owners may also forgo protection by simply failing to
pay their “maintenance fees,” which are required to keep their patents in force. Maintenance fees are due at 3 ½, 7 ½
and 11 ½ years after the patent has issued. Maintain Your Patent, USPTO, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent (last visited ____).
82
See, e.g., Kline & Rosenberg, supra note __, at 285-289.
83
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES, A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CAPITALIST PROCESS 149 (2d ed. 1947) (describing the three phases of innovation).
84
Id.
85
Kline & Rosenberg, supra note __, at 283 (describing the view that innovation is a well-defined, predictable,
homogeneous process, “serious[ly] mistake[n].”)
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to be economic dead-ends. 86 The path to the market often includes interruptions and delays. 35,
153, 29 years, respectively, elapsed between the first patentability and commercialization of the
television, jet engine, and helicopter. 87 It took 264 years for the insight that scurvy, a common
disease among sailors that caused gum decay and often, death, could be prevented by vitamin C,
to fully diffuse. 88 Many lives were lost in the interim. But the patent clock, once started, cannot
be stopped, and the incentive to diffuse the invention may also get lost in the interim. Scholars
have blamed the 20-year fixed patent-term as being too short to support the development, for
example, of therapies to prevent or treat early stage cancer. 89
2. Matching Products to Patents
Even when patents are timely, they can only exclude when there is something to exclude. Yet
the majority of patents is not practiced. 90 Even when they are, they must be matched to products,
a task that can be challenging. For example, it is easier to tell whether a competitor is selling a
particular product than whether they are using a particular process, making product patents more
effective than process patents for appropriating value from invention. 91 Because the ease of
detection is not necessarily correlated with social value, the comparative excludability of patents
introduces potentially undesirable distortions into the innovation ecosystem. 92

3. Enforceability and Enforcement of Patents
To exclude, patentees not only be able to detect infringement but also, have the resources
and will to enforce their patents. To enforce a patent is expensive, 93 with reputational

86

Id. at 283 (contrasting the intellectual nature of invention with the economic nature of innovation); Michele
Boldrin, & David K. Levine, Rent-Seeking and Innovation, 51 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 127 (2004)
(calling the idea that pure or disembodied ‘‘ideas’’ have economic and productive value “patently false”).
87
Kitch, supra note ___, at Table 1.
88
Frederick Mosteller, Innovation and Evaluation 211 SCIENCE, No. 4485, 881, 882 (Feb. 27, 1981)
89
Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin, & Heidi Williams, Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?, (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 19430, 2013).
90
Kline & Rosenberg, supra note __, at 276 (the “overwhelming majority” of patented inventions is never
commercialized), accord Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341, 343.
91
See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note __, at Table 1 reporting lower across the board numbers for process as opposed
to product patents as sources of appropriability.).
92
Syed & Kapczynski, supra note __, at 1942.
93
Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., Report of the Economic Survey I-129-I-132 (2013).
(reporting that the average cost of a patent infringement suit where less than $1 million is at risk is $968,000
inclusive of all costs, per side and more for higher value disputes).
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consequences. 94 Because a patent’s validity can be questioned even after it is granted, patentees
subject their patents to attacks when they try to enforce – losing 42% of the time in court, 95 and
around 77% of the time, on all claims at issue, in certain proceedings before the USPTO. 96 Given
these expenses and odds, it’s no wonder the patent system is said to be characterized by
“pervasive noncompliance and nonenforcement.” 97

C. Patents as Mechanisms of Appropriation
None of the evidence reviewed thus far supports that patents are never effective at
deterring imitation. In fact, the data shows that patentees believe the opposite, and are seeking
patents to do so. 98 The literature nonetheless identifies several limits to using patents as intended,
as described above.

94

Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 291 (describing the economics of patent
enforcement).
95
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (Figure 4) (2014).
96
Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 93
(2014) (based on the first two years of adjudications).
97
Rebecca Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53, 59 (2011).
98
See supra, Part I.A.1.2.
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Table 1: How Important are Patents, Relative to Other Mechanisms, for Appropriating or
Protecting Competitive Advantages? (Relative Rank)
Levin (1987) 99

Cohen (2000) 100

1. Sales/Service Efforts 1. Lead Time
2. Lead time

2. Secrecy

3. Learning

3. Complementary
Manufacturing
4. Complementary
Sales/Service
5. Patents

4. Patents to prevent
duplication
5. Patents to secure
royalties
6. Secrecy

NSF 2008 101
(R&D firms)

Nagaoka and Walsh
(2010) 102

1. Trade Secret

1. First Mover
Advantage
2. Trademark
2. Complementary
Manufacturing
3. Copyright
3. Complementary
Sales/Service
4. Utility Patent 4. Secrecy
5. Design Patent 5. Patent
Enforcement

6. Other Legal

6. Collaboration
7. Product/Process
complexity
The data on how patents are actually used, as compared to the reasons that patents are sought,
reinforce these limits. A number of studies have probed the relative importance of patents to
companies. These studies have generally found the answer to be, less important than other means
of appropriation (Table 1) although with some industry variation. In the Berkeley Patent Survey,
young biotechnology company respondents rated patents as more important than other forms of
appropriation, 103 however, Cohen’s survey in 2000 of companies found that in no industry were

99

Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 18 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783 (1987), Table 1 and 792-793. (showing the mean ratings given to patents and
other mechanisms for protecting products, based on a survey of 650 public companies with R&D expenses in excess
of 1% or $35M).
100
Cohen et al., supra note ___, at Fig.1 (showing the mean percentage of product innovations for which a variety of
mechanisms, including patents, were considered effective).
101
John E. Jankowski, Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection Documented in NSF Survey, INFOBRIEF
NATIONAL CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING STATISTICS (Feb. 2012), Figure 2 (showing the share of
businesses that reported that a form of intellectual property right was very or somewhat important, based on a survey
of firms with R&D activity).
102
Nagaoka & Walsh, supra note ___, at Fig. 11 (showing the share of survey respondents who rated the
appropriation strategy highly).
103
Graham et al, supra note ____ at Figure 1.
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patents more important than secrecy or lead-time, including drugs, basic chemicals, and
miscellaneous chemicals. 104
D. Revisiting the Balance of Exclusion and Diffusion in the Patent System
Taken together, the theory and evidence present an acknowledged paradox. 105 According
to the dominant, utilitarian rationale, the reason we have a patent system is to incent the
cultivation and disclosure of innovation. The right to exclude – the only right that a patent holder
gets – is the mechanism by which the system stimulates this innovation. Because they think
patents can deter copying, innovators file for patents. (Figure 1).
But a funny thing can happen on the path between the patent office and the market. Many,
likely most patented inventions aren’t ever commercialized. Existing products are often not
covered by patents. And whether a competitor is actually infringing may be hard to detect, or not
within a company’s interest or business plan to determine, and then act upon. And so, during the
lifetime of a patent, the objective of excluding others with patents can recede, and other
objectives can emerge, in importance.
Tesla’s experience fits this pattern. Tesla originally got patents, “out of concern that the big
car companies would copy our technology,” 106 reinforcing the instinct shared by most
innovators– to use patents to prevent imitation. 107 However, over time, Tesla discovered “[w]e
couldn’t have been more wrong. The unfortunate reality is the opposite: electric car programs []
at the major manufacturers are small to non-existent.” 108 However, just because Tesla is
abandoning the desire to prevent copying, it isn’t abandoning its patents. Instead, it is using them
to encourage adoption of its technology and for defensive purposes. 109 In the meantime, Tesla
104

Cohen et al, 2000, supra note ___ at Table 1 and 2.
See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005)
(describing the “patent paradox” as the dramatic rise in “patent intensity—patents obtained per research and
development dollar” …“even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished”); Bronwyn H. Hall and
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study Of Patenting In The U.S.
Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001) (studying the “patent paradox” of “the gap
between the relative ineffectiveness of patents (as reported in surveys) and their widespread use”).
106
See Musk, supra note __.
107
See supra, Part I.A.1.
108
See Musk, supra note __.
109
Patent Pledge, TESLA MOTORS, https://www.teslamotors.com/about/legal (last visited ___) (defining what it
means for a party to not act in good faith as asserting patents against Tesla, challenging Tesla patents, or knocking
off Tesla’s trademark).
105
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has also used its patents to secure financing. 110 Though not the primary reason Tesla acquired
patents, these non-exclusionary uses promote innovation at the company.
In the next section I consider the economic importance of “innovation by diffusion,” which
depends on the spread of technical knowledge from one setting to another, as another important
way in which the patent system can support innovation.
Part II: The Case for Supporting Innovation by Diffusion
The innovation by exclusion story in which patents are used to exclude rivals fits well the
“linear model of innovation” in which the stages of innovation happen within the boundaries of a
single firm. 111 But this model has been described as increasingly “less accurate.” 112
A. Defining Innovation by Diffusion
If innovation doesn’t always follow a linear path, what path does it follow? In this Part, I
explore nonexclusionary models of innovation, or what I call “innovation by diffusion.” What is
“innovation by diffusion”? Diffusion is the spread of an idea, product, practice, or other cultural
element as it disseminates or “takes off” throughout society. 113 Or more precisely, “the process
by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of
a social system.” 114 I define innovation by diffusion, then, as innovation in which the invention,
or other key input to the innovation process, comes from an external source.
As new innovations drive economic growth and promote social welfare, understanding the
mechanisms and organization of innovation and its diffusion are of broad interest. 115 An
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Jack Ellis, Despite the patent ‘giveaway,’ Tesla has been Monetising its Portfolio All Along, IAM (June 27, 2014),
http://www.iam-magazine.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=b6ef62d3-99a7-4637-bea6-c696c61810b1 (last visited ____).
111
Supra Part I.B.2; see also Benoît Godin, The Linear Model of Innovation: The Historical Construction of an
Analytical Framework (Project on the History and Sociology of S&T Statistics, Working Paper No. 30, 2005).
112
See Arora et al., supra note __, at 2.
113
See, e.g., Diffusion – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diffusion
(defining diffusion as “the spread of cultural elements from one area or group of people to others by contact”);
THOMAS W. VALENTE, NETWORK MODELS OF THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS [pincite needed] (1995) (defining the
diffusion of innovation as “how ideas, products and opinions ‘take off’ and spread throughout society”).
114
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (3d ed., The Free Press 1983), 5 (1962).
115
Studies of innovation have not been limited to a single discipline, but attempted by scholars in a number of fields.
As British economist Christopher Freeman has said “Innovation is far too important to be left to scientists and
technologists. It is also far too important to be left to economists or social scientists.” See CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN,
THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 309 (Penguin Books) (1997). For a description of this literature, see
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extensive literature has considered the inputs to innovation provided by particular outside
sources, for example universities, 116 users, 117 and customers. 118 When these actors are not wellpositioned to commercialize their technologies, they must seek external partners to get the job
done. Chesebrough’s work on “open innovation” explains how looking outside has become an
imperative for commercializing firms as well. 119 In this part I discuss three case studies of
innovation by diffusion, and the role of patents in facilitating the spread of both technical ideas
and the permission to use them. Although drawn from variety of contexts, these case studies
share two characteristics. First, innovation is happening, not because the inventor retained
exclusive rights, but the opposite – because the invention spread from one setting to another.
And second, the patent system is facilitating this diffusion.
B. Open Innovation in Manufacturing
Open innovation is the use of inflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation and the
use of outflows of knowledge to expand markets for the external use of innovation. 120 It is the
“antithesis of the traditional vertical integration model,” where the ideas that are developed come
from within a firm. 121
In 2000, Proctor and Gamble (P&G), found itself in an innovation rut. R&D productivity
remained flat even while innovation costs were increasing. 122 Under the leadership of a new
CEO, the company launched a new strategy, based on the insight that some of the company’s
best new ideas came from connecting ideas across business lines. 123 Insights from candles were

id. and Bronwyn Hall, Innovation and Diffusion (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10212, 2004)
(providing an overview of the determinants of diffusion of innovation).
116
Edwin Mansfield, Academic Research Underlying Industrial Innovations: Sources, Characteristics, and
Financing, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 55 (1995).
117
Eric Von Hippel, Lead Users: a Source of Novel Product Concepts, 32 MGMT. SCI. 791 (1986).
118
For an overview, see, e.g. Jacques Bughin et al. The Next Step in Open Innovation, 4 MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 112
(June 2008).
119
HENRY WILLIAM CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND PROFITING FROM
TECHNOLOGY (2005).
120
Id., at 2. (defining open innovation as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate
internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively.”)
121
Id.
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Huston & Sakkab, supra note ___, at 2.
123
Id.
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relevant to soap, and from soap (which is high in fat) to vegetable shortening. 124 Under this new
strategy, the company would look even further, beyond the boundaries of the firm, and retool its
processes to increase ideas coming not “from” their labs, but “through” their labs, including from
customers and other partners. 125
Based on their novel “connect-and develop” (C&D), versus the traditional “research-anddevelopment” (R&D), approach to innovation, 126 P&G has reported increasing the share of its
product portfolio with externally sourced key elements to 45% by 2006. 127 One example is
Magic Erasers, which were discovered by a technology entrepreneur within the firm who found a
stain-removing sponge in a Japanese supermarket. This sponge was, in turn, based on a resin
foam developed by German chemical company BASF and marketed for different uses, insulation
and sound-proofing. 128 Following this initial “discovery” the product was evaluated and
launched in new markets, and then used as the basis of new products developed by P&G and
BASF. 129
In the transformation of its approach to innovation, P&G took advantage of the same insight
that the Lego Corporation did when it embraced open innovation – that “99.99 % of the world’s
most talented individuals” do not work there. 130 In Lego’s case they had the additional
advantage, however, that this 99.9% “probably grew up with and continue to have a relationship
with the Lego brand.” 131 Lego’s turn to open innovation was driven in part by necessity – in the
1990s, the company faced threats from the growing popularity of video games and the
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Mark Dodgson, et al., The Role of Technology in the Shift Towards Open Innovation: The Case of Procter &
Gamble, 36 R&D MGMT. 333, 337 (2006).
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Id.; see also Karim R. Lakhani & Jill A. Panetta, The Principles of Distributed Innovation, 2 INNOVATIONS 97
(2007) (citing the maxim in business attributed to Sun co-founder Bill Joy, “No matter who you are, most of the
smartest people work for someone else.”).
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Internet. 132 Lacking experience in interactive toys, they worked with outside partners to develop
Lego Mindstorms – programmable bricks equipped with sensors. 133
Open innovation programs in the private and public 134 sectors have blossomed in recent
years. But until recently, it has been unclear whether or not these examples are at the periphery
of mainstream innovation or indicative of broader trends.
This question was addressed by Arora and his colleagues when they asked manufacturers
about the extent to which they innovated, and their sources of their ideas. 135 Probing the
innovations of the 43% of firms that had recently innovated, 136 their survey focused on “new to
market” innovations, such as, in food, antioxidant chocolates; in chemicals, bio-solvents; in
electronics, a new sort of LCD panel. 137 The surveyors asked who originated the new to the
market product. Strikingly, 49% of respondents reported that their most important new product
had come from an outside source. 138 Respondents then designated the source as being either a
supplier, a customer, another firm in the industry, or a technology specialist, defined as either an
independent inventor, a consultant or engineering service provider, or a university or government
lab. 139 While 53% of outside innovations came from customers, 37% of outside innovations were
sourced from specialists, whose contributions were more economically significant. 140 While only
a quarter of outside inventions overall were patented, specialists were much more likely to patent
their inventions. 141
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David Oliver & Johan Roos, Decision-Making in High-Velocity Environments: The Importance of Guiding
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These findings suggest that the diffusion of ideas and inventions across firms is having a
sizeable effect on innovation, and that the patent system is playing an important role. It is
reinforced by markets for technology, described next.
C. Markets for Technology
In a market for technology, an inventor or technology owner transfers her invention to
another setting, by licensing, partnering, or otherwise contracting for it to be exchanged. 142 The
growth of such technology markets is another indicia of the economic significance of including
rather than excluding others in the practice of a patent during its term. While markets for
technology are not new, 143 they have been growing faster than world GDP since the mid1990s. 144 The total value of technology transactions from 1985-1997 was about $27 billion per
year, the equivalent of about 9% of total nondefense R&D spending in developed countries. 145
By 2002, the annual market for technology was about $66B in the US, and about $100B
worldwide. 146
The bulk of technology transactions has been concentrated in a few sectors, namely
chemicals, software, machinery, and engineering and professional services. 147 In chemicals, the
licensing of products and processes has been widespread, according to various strategies. 148 Take
the approach of BP Chemicals, for example. In an area where it is a market leader, acetic acid, it
has licensed very selectively, into markets in which it would otherwise not be able to enter. But
in an area characterized by more competition, polyethylene, it has licensed more extensively. 149
The biopharmaceutical industry has also had a long record of partnerships, signing an estimated
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$32B worth of licensing deals in 2014. 150 In the semiconductor industry, the growth of fabless or
chipless design companies has also created opportunities to license. 151
Universities have been an important source of technology. Earlier work estimates that 15% of
new industrial products, including 31% of new pharmaceutical products, and 22% of new
instrumentation products, could not have been introduced on time without university research. 152
Though the university research often does not originate the invention, it leads to it. For example,
research on the organic chemical properties of silicon is credited with leading to the development
of industrial silicones. 153 Since 1980, when the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, making it easier for
universities to patent their inventions, 154 partnerships with universities have reportedly created
over 4,000 startups. 155 In 2012, university alliances reportedly led to $36.8 billion of net product
sales at 70 startups, and employed 15,741 full-time employees. 156 In 2003, universities originated
330 startups, and 647 in 2012. 157
Patents can be instrumental in such partnerships, giving patentees something to trade, and a
cheaper way to transact than trade secrets afford, due to the risk of inadvertent disclosure or
unprovable theft. 158
D. Defensive Patenting Strategies
A third way patents encourage the spread of ideas is through supporting of freedom to
operate. 159 While it often seems that there are only two approaches for supporting innovation
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with patents – to opt-in and exclude, or to opt-out and share, intellectual property, 160 a widelyused approach between them is to acquire patents in order to share, or “defensive patenting.”
Defensive patenting is the practice of acquiring patents in order to trade with or deter
assertions by others whose patents you may be practicing. 161 In complex technology areas where
advances build upon one another, competitors will often practice each other’s patents. The result
is a sort of détente, in which each is free to access the technology of the other without having to
clear the rights first. Defensive patenting gives those who need it the security to share freely
about their technology, and those who want it, the ability to access and incorporate features that
are patented by others. 162 These freedoms come at a cost, however. The diversion of resources
to patenting and the transactions costs required to support defensive patent portfolios have been
called a drag on innovation, and raise the cost of entry for smaller firms without the resources to
develop large, defensive portfolios. 163
Still, the importance to firms of being able to access others’ technology is reflected in survey
results about the reasons for patenting previously discussed. (Figure 1) Respondents selected
among a number of motives for patenting reflecting the pursuit of “freedom to operate”: 164 to
prevent suits, 165 negotiate or cross-license, 166 and for “pure defense.” 167 59% of companies in the
Cohen study selected the prevention of suits, and 47% chose negotiations as a reason for
patenting. 168 Likewise, Nagaoka and Walsh found “pure defense” to be the third most “highly”
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important reason for patenting, 169 after exclusive commercial exploitation and blocking. 51% of
the respondents to a European Patent Office study agreed with the statement “I patent mainly to
preserve my freedom of operation,” just 15% less than agreed with the statement “I patent
mainly to prevent imitation by competitors.” 170
Exactly how many patents are primarily held for reasons of access, rather than exclusion, is
unknown. But among the top 50 owners of patents, 171 many if not most of them can be
considered “high-tech” companies that depend on freedom of action in order to keep up with the
rapid pace of competition. Five out of the top ten 172 have taken steps to commit some or all of
their patents to defensive uses, as described below.
In a quiet revolution, for example, LG Electronics has opened up tens of thousands of patents
to small and medium-sized companies, 173 and Samsung, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine
Engineering, Hyundai Motor, and Panasonic have taken similar steps. 174 Google, whose patent
portfolio ranks eighth in the world, and Canon, which has the third most patents, have both
committed to restricting the transfer of any of their patents to entities focused on patent
litigation. 175 IBM, which has been the top filer for patents for years, as well as Sony, Google, LG
Electronics, Canon, and over 1,300 other companies 176 are signatories to the Open Invention
Network’s (OIN) “non-aggression” pact, which commits them to granting royalty-free patent
licenses over Linux technology to other signatories. 177 OIN’s pact is true to spirit of “copyleft”
licenses, which share the aim of creating a software commons, and also do so through reciprocity
– requiring those who benefit from others’ forbearance to also forbear. 178
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The economic footprint of Linux is economically significant. The Linux kernel serves as the
basis for Android, which as of 2014 captured 75% of the smartphone market, 179 and the Chrome
web browser, which has 60% of the browser market. 180 Linux is used by 53% of websites that
use UNIX, which in turn powers about 60% of all websites. 181 Linux dominates super computer
operating systems, 182 although it lags Microsoft Windows and Apple’s IOS among desktop
operating systems. 183
E. Patents and Innovation by Diffusion
The three case studies just described describe ways in which patents further innovation
through diffusion rather than exclusion. Instead of keeping their ideas and knowhow to
themselves, firms are strategically sharing them, in order to find partners, or to enable greater
access to the ideas of others. Patents are an integral part of this exchange, with consequences for
the social organization of innovation, and the personal autonomy of creative professionals. 184
If MIT can provide its ideas to Lego, and see them flourish, it can continue doing what it’s
best at– educating and innovating, while Lego can do what is best at – developing, marketing,
and selling great products. If individual inventors can come up with ideas like biosolvents, and
partner with companies to bring these ideas to market, they can share in the benefits of seeing a
successful product come to the market without themselves having to acquire or develop the
expertise that commercialization requires. Property rights, and the ability to trade them, enable
creative people to work autonomously, Robert Merges has argued, with greater freedom to work
on what they want to, with whom they want to, and in the way they want to. 185 Robust markets
for innovation create gains from trade and benefits from specialization, which from the time of
Adam Smith have been perceived as drivers of modern economic growth.
179
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The result is a more participatory, inclusive innovation ecosystem that does not
discriminate on the basis on where an idea is born, but enables the best ideas to find their way to
the market through any of variety of pathways. The next section builds upon these examples to
articulate a diffusion-focused framework for viewing the patent system.
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Part III: Towards a Diffusion Framework for the Patent System
In this part I articulate a novel diffusion framework for viewing the patent system.
Traditionally, patents are thought to impact the diffusion of technology in two ways. Patents
induce the disclosure of technical secrets and information that the public can learn from and be
inspired by. 186 But increased protection also means less competition, higher prices,
and slower diffusion during the patent’s term. 187 According to this pattern of exclusion, followed
by diffusion, patents mediate the tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency. 188 Patents
encourage initial investments to be undertaken, supporting dynamic efficiency. Post-expiration,
the patent system facilitates the widest possible dissemination of the inventor’s knowledge,
furthering static efficiency. 189
But as the examples in Part II show, technical knowledge need not be spread only
through patent documents, nor must permission to practice inventions be relegated to the postpatent period. Open innovation and markets for technology enable inventors to transfer their
technology and ideas to other settings, on exclusive and non-exclusive bases. Defensive
patenting strategies allow firms to more freely access each other’s technologies before a patent
expires.
Nor must innovation by diffusion be at odds with innovation by exclusion. Indeed, a
careful reading of the history of patent law shows that just as exclusion has always been the
means, the diffusion of innovation has always been the desired end. The purpose of the first
patent law was to attract artisans and printers from other territories to Venice. 190 The early
novelty requirement had a distinctly nationalistic flavor– a patent would be justified only if the
skill was new to the country, 191 and British patents, which were just one sort of privilege that
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was routinely granted throughout Western Europe, 192 extended only to actually produced
“manufactures.” 193 A number of studies have documented the positive link between intellectual
property and the geographical diffusion of technology, 194 though, broader or faster diffusion does
not necessarily lead to greater social welfare if that diffusion is achieved at a higher than
necessary social cost. 195 And although US patent law does not currently require practice of the
patent, it continues to reward it in several ways. 196
The status quo creates space for an alternative lens through which to view the patent system,
based on the ability to simultaneously promote innovation by diffusion and exclusion. I begin by
describing a framework for patent diffusion, and then apply this framework to three mechanisms
of patent diffusion: disclosure, transfer, and the pursuit of freedom to operate.
A. A Framework for Patent Diffusion
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As discussed, diffusion is the spread of ideas and knowledge from one setting to other
settings through specific channels over time. 197 In this section, I describe a framework of patent
diffusion based on the multiple channels by which knowledge of patented or patentable
inventions and the permission to use that knowledge is spread from one setting to another. (Table
2)
Table 2: A Framework for Patent Diffusion
Mechanism of Channel of
Diffusion
Diffusion
Disclosure
Patents and
Related
Disclosures
Patent
Applications
Defensive
Publication
Transfer

Sharing

Technology
Licenses and
Agreements
Defensive
Patent
Strategies

Specifics/Examples
Utility patents, practice of the patent

Utility and provisional patent applications
Disclosures intended to preempt patenting of
the invention and put the invention in the public
domain
Technology transfer, exclusive or non-exclusive
technology licensing, patent standards
Holding patents to provide access to technology
and freedom from suit/patent trading

Patent Waivers/
Pledges

Tesla’s patent pledge, OIN patent non-assertion
promise, and others to forbear, humanitarian or
related waivers, expiration of patents
The patent system can encourage the spread of technical information and permissions, not
only through patents themselves, but through, for example, patent applications, patent practice,
defensive publications, and technology licenses. Each of these channels of diffusion can be
associated with one of three patent-related mechanisms for spreading technical knowledge and
the permission to use it from one setting to another:
•

197

Disclosure encompasses the diffusion of information about patented or patentable
inventions from the inventor to the world. The diffusion of this knowledge can take place
through patent documents and products, without the permission to practice the invention
until the patent is out of force. However, the patent system also encourages disclosures in
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the form of patent applications and defensive publications. When they succeed, defensive
publications put the invention into the public domain, enabling all to use them.
•

Technology Transactions convey information about and permission to practice the
invention, from the patentee to one or more commercializers of the technology. This
diffusion can take place, e.g. through exclusive technology licenses that transfer
technology from one setting to another, or non-exclusive patent licenses that provide
rights to multiple technology implementers. The patent rights are often just one
component of the transfer, which may also include know-how, personnel, and related
resources needed to implement the technology.

•

Acts that facilitate sharing of patented or patentable technologies enable the freer spread
of information and permissions within the innovation ecosystem. These whitespace
creating acts can take place before or during the term of a patent, and can be initiated by
innovators who seek freedom to operate or patentees who want to share their inventions
with others. Before a patent is issued, defensive publication can be used to put
technologies into the public domain. During the term of a patent, permission to practice
can be provided by the patentee through mechanisms like selective patent waiver or
promises to forbear, and extended through practices like defensive patenting. The
patentee may also put the invention in the public domain through patent non-renewal.

Embracing diffusion does not require rejecting exclusion. In fact, in each of the primary
mechanisms of patent diffusion, the right to exclude plays an important role. For example, to the
extent that patent exclusivities motivate the disclosure of useful information, 198 they are needed
to have something to diffuse in the first place. In the case of technology transfer from a patentee
to a commercializer of the patentee’s technology, the patentee’s rights to exclude can be vital to
her willingness to engage in discussions with a potential partner, 199 who may in turn only be
interested in an exclusive license. And defensive patenting to enable freedom to operate depends
critically on the patentee’s ability to retaliate if attacked. Certainly, diffusionary and exclusionary
priorities can be at odds, for example, when patentees forbear from patenting due to the secrets
they must reveal. 200 But in many cases, the exclusive right against the world that patents confer
is more than what a patentee needs or wants.
Focusing on patent diffusion does require the patent system to change its orientation,
however, and to reconsider levers that have largely been overlooked by patent scholars and
policymakers. For example, the patent system’s current bias towards exclusion has arguably
198
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installed certain defaults, to “closed” rather than “open,” that a new focus on diffusion would
revisit. In addition, the patent system does not make it easy for patentees to choose a “diffusion”
or “pure defense” 201 option. In addition, those who want to purposefully put their technologies in
the public domain have no guarantee of being able to do so. A diffusion focus would change that.
In the following sections, I draw upon three disparate strands of patent theory, and extend
them by applying the diffusion framework described above to reveal largely neglected levers of
patent diffusion.
B. Diffusion by Disclosure
“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude,’” 202
the Supreme Court has said. The patent document must disclose the invention, “in sufficient
detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention,” 203 and “stimulate ideas and the
eventual development of further significant advances in the art.” 204 This view makes patent
documents the primary instrument of patent disclosure, and indeed, the measure of whether
exclusive rights are warranted.
A focus on diffusion requires looking beyond the four corners of a patent. The patent system
induces disclosure, not only in the patent, but also through practice and defensive publications.
The terms on which this storehouse of information can be accessed also matter. The mere
production of knowledge does not guarantee that others will be able to exploit it. 205 In this
section, I extend disclosure theory to consider both “content” and “access” levers that can boost
the diffusion of technical information to society through the patent system.
1. Disclosure Theory – Diffusion by Patent Document

201

See Fig. 1, Nagaoka & Walsh, supra note___ at Table 13. (indicating that 45% of US inventor survey
respondents indicated that holding patents for “pure defense” was an important or very important motive for getting
patents).
202
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).
203
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (“the quid pro quo” required of
the patentee “is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the
invention”).
204
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 484.
205
JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, 8-15 (2003).

32

To mature into a patent, each patent application must contain a description of the invention,
how it can be made and used, and the best way of practicing the invention, and demonstrate
possession by the applicant. 206 The main question has been whether or not the “additions to the
general store of knowledge” patents provide in accordance with these legal requirements, are in
fact worth the “high price of...exclusive use” as the Supreme Court has claimed. 207 Critics argue
that they often do not. 208 First, patents today are badly written, because they serve both legal and
technical aims 209 in the hybrid language of “patentese.” 210 Second, firms have incentives to omit
important technical details, and may provide legally insufficient disclosure. 211 Third, the
disclosed secrets are not real secrets, but are already revealed in the case of self-disclosing
inventions, ending up in the gratuitous grant of a patent. 212 Patents can actually retard disclosure
as well, by preventing the publication of ideas that a researcher might later want to patent. 213
The available survey evidence appears to reinforce a dim view of patents as sources of
information. For example, in a survey of 650 publicly-traded firms, patents placed sixth out of
seven types of disclosures. 214 When asked, small and medium enterprises in the UK ranked
patents eighth out of nine sources, 215 behind customers, suppliers, competitors, and other
information sources. 216 In a survey of R&D labs, patents also rated as less important than
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publications and informal exchanges. 217 As the opportunities for exchange grow exponentially,
through communication platforms such as social media and the Internet, and search technologies
makes it easier to find relevant information, patents may fall even further behind.
But even if patents aren’t the most important sources, that does not mean that they do not
have value. This point is underscored in a forthcoming study. Inventors were asked to quantify
the time saved in their respective invention processes when patent information was and was not
available. 218 The responses showed considerable differences across industry. Though the median
value of the time savings was 5.9 hours and the mean, 12.2 hours, in the field of organic
chemicals, on average, readers of patents saved 36 hours of time. In contrast, digital
communication technology patents only saved their readers 1.0 hour, on average. That patents
are likely to disclose more useful details in certain industries than others is reflected in concerns
about patenting that have been expressed in other contexts. For example, 59% of biotechnology
startups responding to a survey stated that their last decision not to patent was motivated by their
desire not to disclose the invention. 219 Only 25% of software startups shared this concern. 220
Even if the invention is disclosed elsewhere, patents often contain details that aren’t otherwise
available. 221
Thus, the answer to the question, do patents provide technical teaching seems to be,
sometimes, but generally less than other sources of information. But there are a number of other
disclosures, besides patents, that the patent system can encourage.
2. Diffusion by Patent Application
Although studies generally do not do so, it is important to distinguish patent applications
from patents as sources of technical information. This is underscored by the relatively lower
217
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patent grant rate in other countries. For example, only 56% of Japanese applications turn into
patents, versus a rate of 87% in the US. 222 This means that about 44% of applications to the
Japanese Patent Office will stay in the public domain where others may imitate them. Patent
applications teach the public in the same way that patents do, but the world is not prevented from
practicing the invention if the application never becomes a patent. This may explain, in part, the
number one ranking that Japanese innovators give to patent disclosures, as compared to other
sources of information. 223 In the same survey, US firms ranked patents only third, behind
publications and informal exchanges. 85% of Japanese firms indicated that patents were
moderately or very important sources of information, while 49% of US firms did. 224
Despite the USPTO’s high patent grant rate, large numbers of US patent applications do not
mature into patents. “Provisional” patent applications are informal documents that describe the
invention. Although they do not become patent applications until a “formal” application is filed,
applicants have incentives to include full, enabling descriptions in their provisional
submissions.225 According to current law, provisional patent applications are not published by
the Patent Office. 226 But filers of provisional applications may want to disclose them, at least for
the reason that this will decrease the chances that others will secure patents over the same
inventions. This calls into question the patent system’s policy of the nonpublication of
provisionals.
3. Diffusion by Defensive Publication
Another overlooked way in which the patent system encourages technical disclosure is
through its ability to provide freedom to operate in return for the disclosure of an idea through
“defensive publication.” Because only new and nonobvious inventions can get patents, creating a
public disclosure that describes an invention, yet is not accompanied by a patent application,
creates “prior art” against subsequent applications and therefore thwarts the ability of others to
222
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later claim the invention. 227 This means that the discloser, and the rest of the world, will not be
precluded from practice by a later-issued patent. The disclosure avoids the cost of patenting, but
secures freedom of action. It also increases the quality of patents that do issue, as it raises the bar
by which new applications will be evaluated. 228 From a diffusion perspective, this represents,
perhaps, the best of both worlds – society gets the content of the disclosure but, also, the
permission to practice it.
Innovators use a number of outlets to defensively publish. Companies like IBM and
Xerox have historically published and distributed their own technical journals, detailing
developments in their research to patent offices. 229 There are also “known” outlets for defensive
publication including the website IP.com, which bills itself as “the world’s first and largest
online prior art disclosure service,” 230 and Research Disclosure, a defensive publishing journal
that has been around since the 1960s. 231 These are disclosures that happen because of the patent
system. However, while defensive publications are reportedly used widely in places like
Germany, 232 and have been used successfully in several US biotechnology contexts, 233 they are
not generally seen as strategic tools by United States intellectual property owners. Only 2% of
intellectual property owners strongly agreed, and 26% agreed, with the statement, “[d]efensive
publication is an important strategic tool for my company,” while 55% of respondents disagreed
and 14% of respondents strongly disagreed. 234 Given defensive publication’s significant
advantages for diffusion, it is worth considering why this is the case and whether or not changes
are warranted.
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4. Access Levers in the Disclosure of Patent Information
Another dimension of patent diffusion concerns the terms of access to patent texts. Though
they have received scant attention, access levers in the disclosure of patent texts, including
timing, search costs, and legal penalties, can accelerate (or retard) the spread of the ideas
described in patents. For example, patent applications are typically published 18 months after
they are filed. However, unlike in most of the rest of the world, US applicants can keep their
patent applications secret, for their entire pendency. 235 This is based on the assumption that
patentees want to keep their secrets for as long as possible. If the application does become a
patent, as most US applications do, it will be released to the world, if it has not already been
published. However, that typically will be years after the application date. 236
The timing of patent publications matters and impacts the diffusion of patented information.
A recent study compared biomedical patent inventions published 18 months after the patent
application with inventions that were not disclosed until the patent issued. Inventions that were
published earlier were licensed, on average, 8.5 months earlier. The shorter licensing cycle was
attributed to the earlier clarification of the inventor’s rights. 237
Another variable that impacts access to patented information is the ability to sift through
large quantities of patents and find the relevant ones. Numerous commentators have lamented the
high costs of searching for relevant patents in fields of cumulative information. 238 But there is no
easy way to tell who owns what patents, 239 which patents are being practiced, or to discern other
indicia of relevance.

235

Stuart Graham & Deepak Hegde, Do Inventors Value Secrecy in Patenting? Evidence From the American
Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, 3 (2014) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170555
236
USPTO 2014 Performance and Accountability Report, 2 (showing the average total pendency of a patent to be 2
years and 3 months)
237
Deepak Hegde & Hong Luo, Imperfect Information, Patent Publication, and the Market for Ideas (Harvard
Business School Strategy Unit, Working Paper no. 14-019, 2013).
238
See, e.g., Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289
(2012) (discussing the high discovery costs of finding relevant patents); Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 55 (2011)
(“Information costs and transaction costs may dwarf potential gains to users from identifying and clearing
rights....”).
239
See Colleen V. Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law (Santa Clara Univ. School of Law, Legal
Studies Research Paper no. 03-12, 2012) (explaining the lack of an ownership recording requirement and the
disambiguation challenge that results from the non-uniform use of assignee information)

37

Finally, as discussed earlier, the legal doctrine of willfulness creates strong disincentives for
inventors to read patents.” 240 This structural problem to enabling effective diffusion of patented
knowledge has been widely recognized. 241 In addition, while no penalty accompanies the reading
and practice of patents that have entered the public domain, it is very difficult to tell whether or
not a patent has done so, or is still in force. 242
In sum, applying a diffusion framework to the issue of patent disclosure reveals a number of
largely ignored levers for influencing the content, timing, and uptake of disclosures encouraged
by the patent system. These include pre-grant publication of patents applications (including
provisionals), the willfulness doctrine, and the effectiveness of defensive publication. These
levers are explored in Section IV.
C. Diffusion by Transfer
Another justification for the patent system is that it facilitates the diffusion of technology
from one setting to another through technology licensing. With some notable exceptions, 243
“commercialization” justifications for the patent system have received less attention than the
classic, reward for invention and disclosure, rationale for the patent system. But the changing
nature of innovation justifies paying more attention to the ways in which the patent system
supports technology transactions.
1. Commercialization Theory – Diffusion Through Trust
According to commercialization theory, patents make transacting easier in several ways.
First, they increase trust between patent owners and potential partners, providing a solution to
Arrow’s information paradox. This is the idea that in the absence of legal protection, an owner
240
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cannot sell information to someone who can make better use of it, because in the process of
selling the information, he will have to disclose it, and the buyer won’t need to pay for it
anymore. 244 Patents, according to the theory, give inventors the security they need to engage in
discussions with potential partners, with less risk that their ideas will be appropriated. 245 Trade
secrets are practically harder to transact in, because disclosing a secret destroys it. 246 Patents are
also theorized to encourage transactions by helping prevent duplicative investments. Once an
inventor has a patent, in certain scenarios, she has an incentive to seek out and license the
technology to others. 247 Patents can play a coordination role, drawing together complementary
users. 248
Yet, reality is more complicated. For technology to actually be transferred from one setting to
another through a technology license requires a number of steps. One study, of Canadian and US
technologies, traced the pipeline. It found that, out of 100 licensable technologies, a potential
licensee was found in 25 cases, negotiations were started in 6 to 7, and licensing deals were
eventually concluded in 3-4. 249 Not only must the parties trust and be willing to talk to each
other, but they first need to find each other, and then go through a series of other steps, including
agreeing on scope, price, and term, before a deal can be signed. Corporate patentholders are
willing to license 70% more patents than are currently licensed; 250 the number is likely even
higher among university patentholders.
There is room for reducing duplicative research. The European Union estimates that $20
billion is spent every year to develop innovations and technologies that have already been
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built. 251 But to prevent this duplication, the parties need to be aware of each other and willing to
transact, and they must agree on the terms of transfer.
To address undercommercialization, some have proposed more and stronger patent rights. 252
But stronger patents rights, by themselves, will not make it more likely that parties will find each
other, or agree to transact. In fact, stronger rights can have the opposite effect, when they cause
rights holders to overvalue their technology. In transactions with universities, for example,
companies often complain that universities aggressively patent, overvalue their intellectual
assets, and issue unreasonable licensing terms. 253
A diffusion lens for viewing the patent system picks up where commercialization theory
leaves off. Rather than focusing only on trust and the theoretical ability to reduce duplicative
research, a diffusion framework also takes into account existing barriers to technology-diffusing
transactions.
2. Diffusion Through the Reduction of Search and Transaction Costs
Why aren’t technology transactions happening more readily? Those who have studied this
question have identified a number of reasons. A persistent problem across both commercial and
academic partnership settings is inherent uncertainty about the value of the technology. 254 Patent
values are so skewed that they have been analogized to lottery tickets. 255 In the university
technology transfer context, for example, the 2007 revenue leader was New York University,
which had made more than $794 million, the vast majority from one pharmaceutical license for
one single commercially successful drug. 256 Only 0.5% of license agreements actually generate
more than $1 million in royalty income, and from 1983 to 2013, 87% of technology transfer
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offices did not break even. 257 Uncertainty about the freedom to operate can play a role, 258 as can
certainty about patent right also matters. This is because, prior to the issuance of the patent, the
parties have asymmetric information about the likelihood of its grant. The buyer may want a
discount to account for the risk that a patent will not issue, or issue with adequate scope. 259
Culture and lack of experience with licensing are also barriers to technology transactions.
Large firms are less willing to license than small firms, and are also less willing to license when
they themselves are practicing an invention. 260 But they also likely have the greatest stock of
uncommercialized patents.
But in addition to these variables, many of which are beyond the scope of this discussion,
some of the most frequently cited obstacles to licensing include the search costs in finding a
technology partner, and friction in the licensing transaction. There is no “universal marketplace”
for technology in which patentees can signal their willingness to license their technology or
patents and potential buyers can express their desire to purchase technology or patents. 261
Deal friction is also a problem. Within commercial contexts, Arora and Gambardella cite fear
of a “winner’s curse” because technology sellers can negotiate with a number of potential
technology buyers at the same time, leading the winner to overpay. While this dynamic is not
necessarily limited to technology transactions, because of the unique nature of intangible goods
and the lack of an agreed-upon approach to technology valuation, the parties lack a common
price anchor, and therefore may be separated by an unbridgeable distance in negotiations. 262
Technology agreements in university settings have similar, and distinct, issues. The
asymmetries between technology buyer and seller are compounded by the fact that the party
negotiating on behalf of the university seller is the technology transfer office (TTO), rather than
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the university inventor with subject matter expertise. 263 University negotiations are known to be
accompanied by friction and delays, with the parties having a hard time agreeing on terms. 264
When the buyer is an investor in a university spinoff, not only must the university trust that the
investor won’t steal its idea, but the investor must also trust that the spinoff to perform. This
creates what Cooter and Scahefer call a “double trust dilemma” 265 that is challenging because
“the investor distrusts the innovator with her money, and the innovator distrusts the investor with
his ideas.” 266 The National Academy of Sciences has recommended that universities seeking to
encourage entrepreneurship should consider instituting more standardized terms for licensing
university-generated technology, 267 with several universities following suit. 268
To make a deal, the parties must want to sell or buy technology, to be able to locate relevant
opportunities, to be willing to talk to each other, and to agree to the terms of the deal. Companies
need to be willing to come to the table in the absence of an impending lawsuit. In Part IV, I
consider ways that the patent system may be able to reduce some of the information and search
costs that accompany each of these transactions.

D. Diffusion Through Sharing
A final way that technological knowledge is spread is by sharing it. By affirmatively giving
up rights to exclude, patent owners spread permissions to access and use technical knowledge.
Freedom to operate motivates 45-60% of companies to patent. (Figure 1) But for patents to serve
this purpose, they must be shared with, rather than held back from others. The more that others
practice one’s patents, the freer one is to practice the patents of others.
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Sharing may be done for humanitarian reasons as well. With patent licenses it has secured
from the NIH, Roche, Bristol Meyers Squibb, Abbvie and others, the Medicines Patent Pool has
expanded access to HIV medicines in over a hundred developing and emerging countries, where
the majority of people with HIV live. 269 Sharing can serve any of a variety of corporate or
personal interests.
Scholars have tended to look at particular vehicles of patent sharing in isolation. 270 But a
diffusion lens looks more broadly at the potential gains and costs of more formally supporting
sharing. That is because, although acts of sharing generally confer private benefits to patentees,
they have social benefits as well, through greater diffusion and freedom of action, and the two
aren’t always aligned. 271 A company may receive positive press from promising that it will share
its technology with others, but society does not get its benefit if this promise isn’t kept. There
may be social gains then, to formalizing such commitments, as long as it does not deter initial
commitment-making.
The next subsection considers the various ways in which companies have tried to share their
patents. The strong desire and even need to share patents, in complex, interdependent
technologies, combined with the lack of easy ways to do so, present opportunities to enhance the
patent system’s diffusive role.
1. Diffusion through Inclusion – Property Theory
How to square the exclusive rights of property with the inclusive desires of property owners
has, over time, captured the attention of property scholars. The right to exclude does not obligate,
but allows property owners to exclude, 272 leading to descriptions of property owners as
gatekeepers, who can exclude, or include others based on the circumstances. 273 Under Coasian
269
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conceptions of property, well-defined property rights are start, not end, points in the allocation of
rights and relations between firms and people. 274
In advancing the idea of a “right to include” alongside the “right to exclude” Kelley has
cataloged the various ways in which property owners can include others, and their costs and
benefits. 275 Informal mechanisms like nonenforcement and waivers have the benefit of relative
ease of administration and low transactions costs – no other party needs to be consulted or
negotiated with. They also have flexibility, property owners can specify themselves the range of
rights that they are giving up, and reveal their intentions according to their own timing. 276 But
this also makes such mechanisms less reliable and certain. Contracts between one or more parties
giving up rights provide more certainty, but are costly to administer and vulnerable to defects in
formation. 277 Because they commit only those who enter into them, rather than the properties
that they impact, contracts can also be, like informal mechanisms, vulnerable to changes in
ownership and other future events, 278 and leave the rights of third party beneficiaries
uncertain. 279 Recognized restrictions on property, including covenants, leases, and servitudes,
may confer rights to enter and use someone else’s land without interference from the property
owner.
Each of these mechanisms has been used to share patents – the largest number through nonenforcement, but also, increasingly, through waiver and contract mechanisms. Each has its
advantages and drawbacks, as described below.
2. Diffusion through Nonenforcement
Most patents are not enforced. 280 Unlike other means of sharing, nonenforcement is passive,
and ex post, effected through the failure of a patentee to bring a suit, once infringement has
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occurred. In many cases, nonenforcement is also not deliberate, but an artifact of the low
commercialization rate of patents and the high cost of enforcement versus uncertain and/or low
damages.
However, some nonenforcement is deliberate. As described earlier, the largest portfolios of
patents are held by companies that rely crucially on freedom of action. 281 Sharing is facilitated
by the mutually assured destruction that would result if parties exercised the overlapping rights
they had in court. Nonenforcement is so pervasive that it has been suggested that the large
proliferation of patents, and their potential harm to innovation has effectively become a
“nonproblem.” 282
However, in a number of cases patents that companies acquired for the sake of defensive
purposes have “turned offensive.” Triggers include changes to the patentee’s business model, or
the transfer of the patents to patent “trolls” that face lower costs and constraints on assertion. 283
These transfers bring into focus the largest drawback to nonenforcement as a tool of sharing – its
lack of durability. There is no reason, once a patent has changed hands, to expect that
nonenforcement will continue.
3. Diffusion through Waiver
A more proactive way of promoting sharing is through affirmative waiver. 284 The number of
public commitments to waive patent rights has proliferated in recent years, leading a nonprofit
entity to memorialize such pledges in a single, online database. 285 This counteracts two
limitations of waivers: their impermanence, and the costs of searching for them, given the
multiple forms that they can take. 286 Cisco and Yahoo have used blog posts 287 and Congressional
281
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testimony, 288 respectively, to announce promises not to sell patents to trolls. AirBnB, Dropbox,
and other companies have signed on to YCombinator founder Paul Graham’s “Patent Pledge,”
which commits each firm listed on a website to refrain from enforcing software patents against
companies with less than 25 employees. 289
Patent holders have used waivers to drive technology adoption. 290 For example,
commitments made in the context of technical standards, protocols that provide a common
design for a product or process, 291 are meant to clear the way for uptake of the standard. The
WCDMA standard, which covers 3G mobile telecommunications, for example, is covered by an
estimated 1,000 patent families. 292 A commitment to make these patents available on “fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) terms reassures standards adopters that they
won’t be subject to surprise attacks after adoption. 293 Standards-setting organizations (SSOs)
commonly include these commitments in their bylaws, which patentholders agree to comply with
when they submit membership applications in exchange for participating during the standards
process. 294
Promises not to enforce patents have also been used to respond to public concerns. Following
scrutiny of a broad patent Southern California Edison held on communications between utility
companies and their customers, the company released it to the public. 295 Myriad Genetics, a
company whose practices led the American Civil Liberties Union to file a suit to invalidate its
highly controversial DNA patents, pledged to give free access to the patents to academic
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researchers. This allowed the company to bolster the claim that it was not an aggressive enforcer
of patents. 296
But while relatively easy to make, promises are hard to enforce under the law, except under
certain circumstances. Those who have made representations to standards bodies have been
criticized for deviating from their public commitments. 297 Under the theory of promissory
estoppel, though, only promises that lead to reasonable reliance are actionable against the
promisor. 298 Showing reliance would be challenging in the case of pledges to “not sell patents to
trolls” – what action can a company reasonably point to taking as a result of just this specific
promise? But even in cases where a company adopts a patented technology, and can prove that
the patentee’s promise not to sue factored into the decision, showing that the company otherwise
would not have adopted the technology can be hard. In addition, in some cases the promisee is
not the implementer, but a third-party organization, for example, that sets up the standard. But
third-party promissory estoppel claims are generally harder to prove. Patent promises are often
vague, failing to identify the patents that they cover. 299 Whether a court would find that a
promise that doesn’t specify the scope of its own rights is reasonable to rely upon is difficult to
predict. Finally, if the patent changes hands, enforcement becomes far more challenging because
promissory estoppel binds the promisor, but not the promisor’s successors in interest. 300
4. Diffusion through Contract
Contract would seem to address some of limitations of waivers and nonenforcement.
Some companies have memorialized their promises to share patents through formal contracts
with their employees 301 and other companies, 302 for example. These deals yield reciprocal
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benefits, or consideration, and access to contract remedies. Yet they entail coordination and
formation costs, sometimes extensive, raise antitrust concerns, and are vulnerable to some of the
same problems that apply to waivers.
For example, the Inventor Protection Agreement (IPA) that Twitter uses promises its
employees that it will only use their patents for “defensive purposes,” 303 a commitment that has
been used to attract talent and build culture at the firm. 304 But while innovators outside the
company are the main beneficiaries of the agreement, they are mere third-parties to the contract,
leaving them on shaky legal ground. 305
Patent pools, in which companies get together to offer patents over a technology,
illustrate some of the issues that can beset patent contracts. Though they have been around since
the mid-1800s, pools were disfavored by antitrust regulators in the 1940’s and 50’s, 306 regaining
popularity only in 1995 when the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
began issuing guidelines to support pools. 307 But while pro-competitive, patent pools can also
entail significant formation costs. Setting up a patent pool requires figuring out which patents
belong in the pool. 308 The parties need to agree on royalties. To capture the greatest efficiency
gains, the pool must attract key patentholders, but often the included patents represent a small
fraction of the relevant patents. 309 And patent pools are subject to antitrust scrutiny because
restrictive licensing terms can raise competitive concerns. 310
This Part has articulated and applied a diffusion lens to the patent system. Promisingly, it has
uncovered a largely overlooked set of levers that the patent system has for promoting the
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diffusion of technical knowledge and the rights to practice this knowledge. But not surprisingly,
many of these levers are currently set to default to exclusion. The changing nature of innovation
make it timely to reconsider these policies.
Part IV: Diffusionary Patent Levers
In this Part, I explore some ideas for how our patent system could be made more supportive
of innovation by diffusion. In some cases, I borrow from suggestions others have advanced while
in others, the suggestions below are starting rather than end points for further discussion.
However, there are some potential concerns to address at the outset.
First, it is important that new options for diffusion represent true options, rather than hardcoded presets, at least to start. For certain inventions, the current patent system strikes just the
right balance between exclusion and diffusion. Giving innovators more options to diffuse their
technologies should not been as an attempt to disrupt the balance where it is working. But by
giving inventors options and incentives to select, for example, earlier publication, or defensive
patenting, the options here can further both private and public interests in the diffusion of
technology and permissions, when they are aligned.
Second, some may question why the patent system should be responsible for ensuring that
innovators can diffuse technology to rivals and others , when its Constitutional mandate, after all,
is to promote the progress by securing “exclusive right(s).” This is a fair question, with several
responses. First, securing exclusive rights to inventors arguably requires giving control of these
rights to inventors, to loosen or tighten at their discretion. Providing inventors with more options
to share their inventions and the practice them with others even during the term of the patent is
tantamount to giving them finer-grained controls over their rights to exclude. Second, a diffusion
lens largely enhances, rather than displaces, existing rationales for the patent system.
Diffusionary levers can be used to further the disclosure function of the patent system. When the
patent system makes it easier to transfer technology, it serves existing commercialization aims.
And when inventors can use their patent rights to access the technology of others, that also
promotes the progress.
Institutional choice questions are also relevant. It’s important to consider what Congress, the
courts, the USPTO, the Department of Justice, and other government institutions of the patent
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system, 311 can and should do, within their mandates, to promote innovation by diffusion, and
what should be left to the non-governmental sector. For example, the nonprofit Creative
Commons offers a number of licenses that reduce the costs of sharing copyrightable content, 312
potentially offering a greater range of choices than a Congressionally sanctioned option.
Finally, all of the policy levers described below could be implemented in many ways. The
USPTO has a history, for example, of encouraging, through fee discounts or other favorable
treatment in examination, certain applicant behavior. 313 The specific design of any intervention is
crucial to its successful implementation, but is beyond the scope of this paper. The
implementation options presented would all need further fleshing out and vetting. With these
provisos in mind, below I describe a few diffusionary levers of the patent system for potential
readjustment.
A. Diffusion by Disclosure
Some patent disclosures contain useful information but there are currently a number of
barriers to diffusing this information, on the earliest schedule possible. Removing these could
enhance the disclosure function of the patent system.
1. Default to Early Publication
US patentholders can keep their US-filed patent applications secret during the entire
pendency of the patent life. When Congress was debating what would become the American
Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), the provision requiring US inventors to publish their
applications received harsh criticism. A group of 24 Nobel laureates declared that the policy
would be “very damaging to American small inventors and thereby discourage the flow of new
inventions that have contributed so much to America's superior performance in the advancement
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of Science and technology.” 314 As a result, American inventors retain the option of electing
secrecy if they do not file for international protection. Provisional patents are never published,
also presumably to keep inventors’ secrets. 315
But despite the strong rhetoric, it’s unclear that patentees actually desire secrecy. According
to a recent study, the majority of inventors with the option of keeping their patent applications
secret chose not to, 316 and even paid to have their secrets revealed. 317 Small inventors, who
critics were particularly concerned about, were actually more willing to have their applications
published than large inventors. 318
To the extent patent disclosures are useful, earlier disclosure benefits the public, as it leads to
the earlier dissemination of technology to the world, including through related publications. But
it also can benefit patentees, enabling them to stake out their position in a technological area 319
and leading to earlier licensing. 320 It also allows the patent application to serve as prior art to and
limit the applications of others. These benefits, in many cases, may outweigh any costs
associated with earlier transparency.
The insight that inventors do not always want to keep their inventions secret, especially in the
face of advocacy asserting the opposite, has broader implications for patent publication policy.
Right now, utility patent applications are published with an 18-month delay. 48% 321 of an
estimated 2M provisional patent applications 322 are never even released to the public 323 because
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they do not mature into patent applications. It is worthwhile to consider changing these defaults.
While early publication technically exists for utility applications, according to a little known
provision of the law, 324 explicitly giving patentees the choice could have great social benefits. A
diffusionary alternative would be to adjust the default for provisionals to be open rather than
closed, and for utility applications to publication upon filing, rather than after an 18-month delay,
but with the right of inventors to opt-out of these choices.
2. Remove Disincentives to Reading Patents
It is also worth revisiting the current, willfulness disincentive for reading patents. 325 The
criteria of “knowledge of the patent” that it is connected to is arguably both overinclusive and
underinclusive, with respect to what the patent system is trying to deter. For example, why
should an innovator who studies and reverse engineers a patentee’s product or website be less
subject to willfulness than one who happens to read a patentee’s patent, along with many others,
in the course of doing routine research? At the same time, why should an innovator be punished
for being comprehensive about checking different sources of technical knowledge, including
patents, which are free to access unlike many technical journals, if there is no evidence that the
patentee actually derived anything from the patent?
One solution, suggested by Lemley and Tangri, would be to substitute the current
willfulness standard with one that would penalize not knowledge of a patent but adopting a
technology with knowledge that it was derived from the patentee, from any source. 326 Mere
knowledge of a patent would not raise the likelihood that an infringer be assessed triple damages.
Rather, there would also need to be some indicia that the patentee took advantage of the
knowledge within the patent, in order to trigger the penalty. 327 Another, administrative solution,
would be to enable patentees to search among expired and lapsed patents, where no willfulness
penalty applies. While reading these patents would not subject the reader to enhanced
willfulness, there is no easy way to access just these patents. 328
3. Remove Barriers to Putting Technology in the Public Domain
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It is worth considering how to remove barriers to innovators putting technology in the
public domain. Defensive publication offers an important way, but for it to work, it requires the
USPTO to be aware of the publication and to apply it to block the grant of a related application.
While this process can be successful, patent examiners tends to rely on patents, not publications,
for prior art, 329 and have limited time to search for new references, 330 when they examine
patents. At times, defensive publications have been considered to fall short of preempting
because they do not contain sufficient technical disclosures, 331 or the PTO process has tended to
skip over them. 332 These realities may be contributing to the low rate of defensive publication in
the US. 333
Replacing the PTO’s Defensive Publication Program, 334 beginning in 2000, the USPTO
maintained a statutory invention registry containing the specifications of a regularly filed
application for a patent without examination.335 A statutory invention registration (SIR) was not
a patent, but because it was filed with the PTO, and was prepared like a patent, it was more likely
to be seen and applied by examiners. 336 However, the SIR program was unpopular, likely due to
the cost of preparing registrations, and was abandoned in 2011. 337
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Recently, the USPTO has taken a number of executive actions to improve the quality of
patents by using crowdsourced prior art. 338 International patent practices may be instructive to
consider as it does so. The Patent Cooperation Treaty requires “mandatory search” of certain
patents databases that the public can submit prior art to. 339 This provides greater reassurance that
submitted documents will actually be reviewed. The European Patent Office (EPO) has also
worked to integrate technical databases of practice with patent search databases. 340 The USPTO
has been urged to do the same. 341 But to ensure a thorough search, it would also need to give
examiners adequate time to search non-patent references.

4. Remove the Marking Requirement’s Penalty for Practice
As described earlier, patent law has long rewarded the practice of patents. 342 Descriptions of
the early US patent system circumscribed the subject of a patent as “something that has been
reduced to practice; it is not enough that it is merely practicable or possible.” 343 But there are
other ways in which patent law has come to penalize the practice, rather than non-practice, of
patents. The “marking doctrine” in patent law requires those who practice their inventions to put
the world on notice by marking products or their packaging in order to recover damages during
the full period of infringement. 344 The purpose of the marking requirement is to prevent innocent
338
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infringement and encourage patentees to give notice of the existence of their patents. 345
However, according to case law, the requirement does not apply to those who do not practice
their patented inventions 346 or to process patents. 347 This interpretation of the law discriminates
in favor of non-practicing patentees and owners of process patents, who are automatically
entitled to damages as of the time of infringement. 348 Closing these loopholes, as others have
called for, 349 would remove the current biases against practiced and product patents, further
contributing to enhanced disclosure to the public.
B. Diffusion by Transfer
Commentators have identified a number of challenges in current markets for technology.
While few would argue that the government is in the best position to “make markets,” there may
be ways for the patent system to nevertheless reduce the search and information costs of
transacting in technology that have been identified as obstacles to technology transfers.
One of the USPTO’s two enumerated duties, for example, is to “be responsible for
disseminating to the public information with respect to patents and trademarks,” 350 and the
USPTO, by virtue of its position within the patent system, is well positioned to collect, and
disseminate, a number of types of information. It could use this power in a few ways.
1. Enable Public Recordation of Licensing Offers, without Litigation Impact
The USPTO could make it easier for potential technology partners to find each other by
enabling patentees to indicate, and the public to discover, the availability of the technology for
licensing. This could take place through a program like the licensing feature that the World
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has offered since 2012. 351 Applicants to international
patents can report licensing information and terms to international patent authorities, to be
disseminated to the public in order to promote voluntary licensing. 352 In November 2013, WIPO
introduced the WIPO GREEN online marketplace, which enables sellers and buyers to more
readily find each other, in order to promote the innovation and diffusion of green technologies. 353
One persistent concern with these programs, however, is that if patentees list patents for
licensing, they may lose the ability to later seek exclusive rights. In the US, courts consider the
inadequacy of legal damages to decide whether or not to grant injunctions. 354 But that can be
harder to prove if the patentee has an “open licensing” policy. To address this concern, courts
should recognize that such listings do not mean that patentees are not giving up exclusion, even
as they also seek diffusion, through transfers.
Another issue has been the lack of dissemination of information regarding the availability
of patents for license, once disclosed. US patent owners can technically already provide “notice
of the availability of an application or a patent for licensing or sale” to the USPTO, 355 however,
this information is not disseminated except through a little-read weekly publication of the PTO,
the Official Gazette, and not searchable by patent number. A small administrative change,
enabling licensing offers to be searchable and recorded within the patent record, could greatly
enhance the discoverability of license information.
Taking such steps could reduce the costs of ensuring that willing buyers and willing
sellers can find each other.
2. Enhance Patent Information Infrastructure & Create Registries of Licensing Data
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To make a market, accurate, available data is essential. Although the PTO’s statutory
mandate is to transmit patent information in fulfillment of this mandate, 356 the current patent
information and reporting infrastructure suffers from gaps in the statutory authority, compliance,
and reporting of patent information that could be filled.
The most glaring recent omission concerns who owns a patent. Patent ownership is a critical
determinant of the patent’s likely path, but currently, reporting ownership to the USPTO is
voluntary. 357 Though current law protects against certain types of fraud if such updating
occurs, 358 there is no way to be sure who owns a patent. Although the USPTO, implementing an
executive action of the White House, recently undertook an initiative to require recordation of
patent ownership, it ultimately concluded that legislative authority was the best way to impose
this requirement. 359
Even existing rules requiring the production of patent information are not necessarily
followed. Trial courts are required by law to let the PTO know when a patent is litigated, and the
adjudicated outcome. 360 The PTO is required, in turn, to include this information in the file of
each patent. 361 However, only about 65% of patent files contain the requisite information. 362
Knowing if a patent has been previously litigated– and the outcome of this litigation– clearly has
significance for an invention’s dissemination. If the patent’s claims are invalidated as a result of
the litigation, for example, they essentially enter the public domain, and are no longer the subject
of the patentee’s exclusive rights.
Patent information has also been underreported in the context of federally-funded
inventions. The Bayh-Dole Act allows recipients of federal research funding, such as
universities, to take title to inventions created using federal funds. While the Act affords
universities with considerable latitude when exercising their patents rights, it contains a number
of accountability safeguards to ensure that federally-funded intellectual property is being
356
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disseminated appropriately. Specifically, grantees must report any subject invention 363 developed
based on federal funding, and also, periodically report on utilization and efforts at obtaining
utilization. 364 But an analysis of academic biomedical patents found prima facie evidence of
underdisclosure of even the government interest in patents, 365 with a reporting rate of 60-90%
among known government-funded patents. 366 Utilization data, which could be used to drive
greater dissemination of federally-funded invention, is even harder to come by. 367
Yet this information is essential to several functions of that directly bear on how the
invention is disseminated. Without it, it’s difficult for the government determine whether or not
to compel licensing as it is entitled to in cases where the invention has not achieved practical
application. 368 More generally, the federal government cannot effectively carry out its oversight
role – as it has been said, if you can’t measure, you can’t manage. Citing a GAO study that found
patent information to be incomplete and access-restricted, the National Academy of Sciences has
recommended that federal research agencies reinvigorate data reporting by institutions. 369 The
university community, in turn, has suggested that improving the functionality and usability of
databases that contain data about federally funded inventions would enhance compliance. 370
Greater information about patent licenses could also be used to facilitate technology
transfer. The lack of comparable licensing data contributes to the gulf in licensing terms that
parties to a patent transaction must bridge in order for the license to be formed. But two sets of
licensing data that are available through governmental processes could help close the gaps:
licenses that are reported in the process of litigation and, as long as not sealed, become part of
the public litigation record, and licenses that are formed on the basis of US government-funded
inventions and are required to be disclosed by law. 371 Confidential information could be stripped
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through a redaction protocol, in a way consistent with President Obama’s Open Data policy. 372
An industry effort to share sanitized licensing data, which is largely currently under NDA,
conducted in a way consistent with antitrust concerns, could also help to narrow the gap in
expectations between parties.

C. Diffusion by Freedom to Operate
A final set of diffusionary levers would make it easier for those who want to give away or
share their patent rights, and for those who want to rely on these commitments, to do so.
1. Make it Easier to Waive and Rely on Waivers of Patent Rights
Currently, there is no easy way for patent holders to give some of their rights to the
public while reserving others to themselves. To address each of these defects, Contreras has
proposed creating a public registry of patent pledges, based on building one himself. 373 A public
registry would reduce the risk of failure to discover that a patent is encumbered with a pledge,
and the cost of finding pledges, which may otherwise “disappear.” 374 A promise that is
memorialized as an official government record has a better chance of traveling with the patent,
even if it changes hands or goes through bankruptcy. Multiple commentators have suggested that
courts embrace expanded reliance theories to obligate patentees to keep their promises, 375 but an
individual defendant has a better chance of prevailing if the promise is actually known to them,
which they can more easily prove if the promise is recorded.
I offer two refinements to Contreras’ registration suggestion, which would do much to
bolster the legitimacy of patent pledges. First, the recorded pledge should be integrated into the
patent record, at the patent level where possible, or the assignee level, if the pledge is not specific
enough. Otherwise, the efficiency gains from a centralized repository risk going unrealized.
Fortunately, the USPTO already has an existing mechanisms for recording encumbrances on
372
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specific patent, its I-1595 form, which allows patentees to record security interests that others
have in the patent. 376 This form could be modified to include “waivers.” Second, I suggest that
members of the public also be allowed to initiate, though not to complete, public recordation of
waivers. This can help create a record of reliance for the initiator or recordation (or “recorder”)
and also disincentivize shirking by the patentee who might otherwise publicly promise to waive,
and receive the public relations benefit of doing so, without actually keeping the promise.
Though the actual mechanics would need substantial refinement, patentees could receive
protection from opportunistic or false waiver recordation requests. This could be addressed, for
example, through the paying of a fine by recorders whose suggestions prove false, to be split
between the patent office and the patentee, and upfront bonding before the USPTO undertakes
action to verify the claim and record it.
Merges has suggested enacting a statutory scheme that would enable items to be sold
with a “Patent Waived” notice. Like existing statutory marking schemes which reward the
marking of items with “Patent Pending” or “Patented” notices, such a scheme would create
rights, but for the public, which would be able to rely on the public domain status of the item. 377
While his idea is promising and would reduce search costs, further proof of the demand for this
sort of mark is warranted before investing in a new regime.
2.

An “Open” or “Defensive Only” Option
One other option for supporting innovation by sharing is to allow those who want waive

certain rights, for example to give up certain rights, for example, to support “green”, educational
or noncommercial, uses, or to give up offensive rights and patent defensively only. Although
many patent “flavors” could be explored, in the following paragraphs, I explore in depth the idea
of an “open” or “defensive only” patent because the broad use of defensive patenting suggests
that there is demand for this option. 378 While the exact parameters would need to be tested with
the patentees and refined, a new version of a patent that is “defensive only,” could have limited
enforceability in general, but full enforceability when the patentee is first attacked. Such an
election would allow patentholders to signal to the world which patents they are holding not to

376

USPTO Recordation Form Cover Sheet Form-1595, available at http://www.uspto.gov/forms/pto1595.pdf
Merges, Dynamism, supra note __, at 201.
378
See Parts II.D., III.D. (describing efforts of OIN, Google, and Twitter, to reserve defensive only rights in patents)
377

60

exclude others, but for defensive reasons, and dramatically reduce the likelihood of litigation by
limiting the ability of the patentee to later “change their mind,” in the same way that many of the
patent pledges have tried to. 379
The class of “proprietary inclusion mechanisms,” including easements and servitudes, to
which a defensive-only patent would belong, is associated with a number of benefits and
drawbacks. The “defensive-only” status of a patent is likely to be more enforceable than a
contract or waiver, because it is attached to the property, rather than to the owner. This puts
third-party beneficiaries on equal footing with others and also, in general, makes the “disarmed”
status of the patent less vulnerable to changes in ownership. 380 The notice costs are also lower
than for less formal mechanisms, as long as the limitation of rights is publicly recorded.
Standardization reduces information and bargaining costs, 381 and reduces opportunism, for
example as reflected through clever drafting that reserves more rights even while giving the
promisee goodwill. Another advantage of sanctioned sharing mechanisms is the availability of
remedies that go beyond the traditional compensatory damages that are typically available in
contract law, including specific performance. 382
However, proprietary inclusion mechanisms also have their critics. They are less flexible
than contracts and waivers, and certainly, a “defensive-only” option would not capture the full
range and conditions of desires to share patents that exist. In addition, those who promote the
idea that the number of forms of property should be limited, according to the numerus clausus
(the “number is closed”) principle point to the burdens on third parties that property forms create.
The existence of nonstandard property rights increases the cost of transacting in the property
regimen. 383 In addition, creating a new property right could require Congressional authorization,
an expensive undertaking that may not allow for the continual refinement that would be needed
to ensure that a new property form would be appropriate and enduring.
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However, a number of these objections could be addressed by adoption of a “defensiveonly” option for inventors that is reflected, not in a new property form, but the discounting of
patent fees based on the voluntary waiver of the exclusive rights held by patentees. Though this
idea is novel, it is not completely unprecedented. In several countries, patentholders can pay
discounted fees maintenance fees if they voluntarily agree to offer their patents for licensing to
all comers. Under Germany’s “License of Right” (LOR) scheme, for example, a patent owner
that declares that anyone can practice the invention in return for reasonable compensation
receives a 50% discount off their maintenance fees; 384 the UK includes a similar scheme. 385 The
German LOR option is elected in about 6% of cases overall, but the rate varies significantly by
technology area: a 2012 study found that 11% of electrical engineering patents had such
declarations, but only 1% of biotechnology patents did. 386
Again, I believe several modifications would be needed to make such an option viable in
the United States. One problem with LOR options is that they curtail the ability of patentees to
enforce patents in any context. However, the defensive choices that companies have made
demonstrate that, to the contrary, patentees do often want to retain the ability to enforce their
patents. 387 Thus, a variant of this approach would limit patentholders’ rights to “defensive-only”
contexts, in exchange for a discount on the patent’s maintenance fees. Some thinking needs to be
devoted to fleshing out what “defensive” really means. However, assuming it can be determined,
the savings could be quite considerable. For a medium-sized company with a portfolio of 1,000
patents of various ages, 1/3 of which are being renewed in any given year, a 50% discount in fees
could represent a $1.4M savings in maintenance fee costs. 388
Another departure from current practice concerns permissible changes to the patent’s
status. In the UK and Germany, patentholders can change the “LOR” status of patents each time
a maintenance fee is paid. However, in order to enable patentees to rely upon and make
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investments based on the “defensive-only” status of patents, it is arguably important that
patentees not be able to change their mind after a patent has taken on “defensive-only” status.
Clearly, that is the intent of companies like Twitter and Tesla, who have said, respectively, that
their defensive “promise stays with the patent” 389 and “[s]hould Tesla ever transfer a Tesla
Patent to a third party, it will do so only to a party that agrees, by means of a public declaration
intended to be binding on such party.” 390 Of course, the binding nature of a “defensive-only”
election must be considered in view of its impact on uptake of the option, especially in light of
the changing priorities of companies. One could imagine a one-way ratchet, in which patentees
could elect or default to the “defensive-only” option later in a patent’s life, after the patentee has
more information about its intent to practice it, but once defensive, a patent could not lose its
defensive-only status. Extensive testing and further refinement would be needed. Other
important variables to consider include the definition of “defensive-only” uses and size of the
discount.
The salutary effects of “disarming” a large number of patents make these details worth
considering further. To the extent that society gets the benefit of the patent system– invention
and disclosure– without the higher costs that come with exclusive rights, defensive-only patents
may represent the best of both worlds. For those who seek to provide and have freedom of
action, it would reduce the costs and the risks of participating in the patent system. With a
defensive intent provided transparently and on the record, it would provide an easier way for
industries to collectively self-correct and make it easier to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma that
although, the whole may be better off when all forbear, no individually forbearing firm is better
off when it acts by itself.
3. Reconsidering Maintenance Fees
It is worth exploring further how to calibrate the patent fees patentees pay to keep their
patents in force after they are issued, to strike the right balance between diffusion and exclusion.
US patents are a relative bargain, ranking in the bottom third of both fees paid before and after a
patent is granted, 391 and the lowest in the world in relation to total GDP. 392 The USPTO’s
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relatively lower fees are correlated with a relatively higher patent renewal rate. Close to 50% of
US patents remain in force by their twentieth year, as opposed to about 20% of European
patents. 393 But letting patents lapse hastens their diffusion. Although this topic deserves much
more discussion than I can afford here, setting USPTO fees based on considerations of diffusion,
particularly at the end of a patent’s life when the patentee has likely already reaped the reward,
could hasten this diffusion without undercutting the benefits of exclusion.
Part V: Conclusion
The US patent system rewards invention and disclosure with exclusion. But its ultimate aim
in doing so is to “promote the progress” of the useful arts, through the diffusion of ideas,
products, and learnings to the public. The nature of innovation is changing, enabling greater
collaboration and fostering interdependence between innovators. The patent system can support
the disclosure of technical information, reduce the cost of transacting in technology, and
facilitate the exchange of permissions in support of freedom to operate. This paper has
articulated and applied a diffusionary lens to these roles, uncovering several overlooked levers
for promoting innovation.
Specifically, to enhance patent disclosure, the USPTO could enable patentees to publish their
provisional applications, and their utility applications upon filing, rather than waiting until 18months after filing. Though current policies are meant to protect innovators from diffusing their
ideas prior to excluding others, inventors do not always want such protections, the data
suggests. 394 The USPTO could also make it easier for innovators to put their inventions in the
public domain, for example, by better integrating databases of practice and purposive disclosure
with patent office searches, and giving patent examiners enough time to search through nonpatent references. The courts or Congress could also do their part, by removing barriers to the
reading of patents, and the bias against practice embedded in current “marking” law.
The USPTO and private sector could also further support markets for technology, by making
it easier for potential patentees and licensees to find each other, and to successfully complete
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transactions. The USPTO could consider making it easier for patentees who want to waive their
rights to do so, by creating infrastructure for the recordation of patent waivers that the courts can
in turn uphold, creating a “defensive-only” fee option, and calibrating maintenance fees.
As the needs of innovation change, so should the patent system consider doing so, by
creating more options for innovators to individually tailor the patent system to meet their specific
needs. By embracing an “all of the above” approach that embraces exclusion and diffusion, the
patent system can broaden its support for innovation in all forms.

65

